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Concerns about groundwater depletion in the High 
Plains Aquifer and other aquifers throughout the 
world have been well documented in the media and 
the scientific literature. A recent study found that 
groundwater use exceeds recharge in about one-third 
of the world’s largest aquifers (Barringer, 2015). Thus, 
developing appropriate groundwater management 
policies that encourage conservation and preserve the 
long-run viability of aquifers is of paramount im-
portance in many regions. However, policies and in-
stitutional arrangements in many areas may exacer-
bate aquifer depletion by encouraging groundwater 
consumption. Policies that subsidize the cost of energy 
inputs may increase groundwater extraction. Subsi-
dized electricity or diesel rates for irrigators are perva-
sive in many countries including India, Mexico, and 
Tunisia (among many others). Concerns about neigh-
bors using groundwater and depleting a shared aqui-
fer may lead to all irrigators using more water than if 
the aquifer was not shared. Using inefficiently large 
amounts of groundwater is a concern as it can lead to 
the depletion of existing aquifers and an increase in 
future costs as groundwater tables are drawn down.  
In a recent study we use data from Mexico to examine 
the effect of three characteristics of groundwater use. 
Specifically, we examine the effect of well sharing, cost 
sharing, and energy subsidies on the efficiency of 
groundwater use. The data was collected during the 
2003 – 2004 winter season by the Instituto Nacional 
de Ecología y Cambio Climático (National Institute of 
Ecology and Climate Change). Two surveys were used 
to collect data for each well. The first survey includes 
questions about the irrigation unit (e.g., number of 
farmers  sharing the well,  crops grown  by producers). 
Market Report  Year 
Ago  4 Wks Ago   
Livestock and Products, 
Weekly Average          
Nebraska Slaughter Steers, 
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . .  .  149.15  160.00  148.23 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .  254.00  289.49  305.08 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .  207.17  227.24  241.78 
Choice Boxed Beef, 
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  238.39  263.19  254.31 
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price 
Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  120.03  78.16  74.05 
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass 
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  124.66  84.86  82.16 
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn, 
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .  154.75  146.30  158.67 
National Carcass Lamb Cutout 
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  359.20  356.28  257.10 
Crops, 
Daily Spot Prices          
Wheat, No. 1, H.W. 
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6.56  4.93  5.09 
Corn, No. 2, Yellow 
Nebraska City, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .  4.43  3.45  3.71 
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow 
Nebraska City, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .  14.05  8.99  9.86 
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow 
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7.73  6.88  7.46 
Oats, No. 2, Heavy 
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.80  2.77  2.94 
Feed          
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185 
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .  193.75  190.00  * 
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good 
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  *  *  * 
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good 
 Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .  100.00  120.00  90.00 
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  145.00  170.50  121.50 
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52.00  52.00  41.00 
 ⃰  No Market          
The second crop-specific survey was completed for each of 
the main crops grown using water from the well. The crop-
specific survey includes questions about inputs (including 
irrigation), yields, and prices for each crop. All of the wells 
in the sample use only groundwater for irrigation and natu-
ral precipitation without any supplemental surface water 
diversions 
Irrigation well characteristics: 
Well sharing: In contrast to the independently owned and 
operated groundwater wells of the High Plains, it is very 
common in many countries for multiple producers to share 
a single groundwater well. This is the situation in much of 
Mexico, as many producers own or use small plots of land, 
and individually owned irrigation wells are technically in-
efficient and prohibitively costly. We use a randomly chosen 
sample of 197 irrigation wells in our study. Of the 197 wells, 
77 (39.1 percent) are owned by a single user while the rest 
are shared by multiple farmers. The 120 shared wells have a 
median of 6 users and an average of 12 users. 
Cost sharing: When multiple farmers share an irrigation 
well they need to choose how to divide the costs associated 
with paying for the electricity necessary to pump ground-
water. There are three methods used to share those costs: 
equal cost sharing, land based cost sharing, and irrigation 
time based cost sharing. With the first method farmers split 
the electricity costs equally (e.g., if 5 farmers share the well, 
each one pays 20 percent of the electricity bill). With the 
second method farmers split the electricity costs based on 
the amount of land irrigated. For example, if two farmers 
share a well and the first plants 10 acres while the second 
plants 20 acres, the first will pay one-third of the bill and the 
second will pay two-thirds of the bill. With the last method 
farmers split the electricity costs based on the number of 
hours each one irrigates. For example, if two farmers share a 
well and the first irrigates for 10 hours per week while the 
second irrigates for 20 hours per week, the first will pay one
-third of the bill and the second will pay two-thirds of the 
bill. Of the 120 shared wells 30 divide the costs equally for 
all users (method one), 45 share costs on the amount of 
land farmed (method two), and 45 share costs on total 
hours of irrigation use (method three). 
Electricity subsidies: Electricity is the primary cost of pump-
ing groundwater in all of the wells included in the study. 
While subsidies in Mexico have been reduced since the 
study period, they have not been eliminated. Removing 
electricity subsidies is frequently advocated as a policy 
change to encourage conservation of water resources. Our 
study results allow us to estimate how much water use 
would be reduced if electricity subsidies were eliminated.  
Methods: Our goal in this study is to measure the impact of 
these three characteristics on the efficiency of   groundwater 
groundwater use. It is important to note that simply 
using a large amount of groundwater is not necessarily 
undesirable if that water use is associated with a high 
level of production. We account for this in our analysis 
by examining water use relative to total yield. We de-
velop three hypotheses based on studies from other 
locations and economic modeling.  
First, we hypothesize that eliminating electricity subsi-
dies will not make a large difference in groundwater 
use. While we will test this with the data from our sam-
ple, studies in other places have generally found a small 
price response in irrigation water use (Hendricks and 
Peterson, 2012). Second, we hypothesize that a greater 
number of farmers sharing a well will increase the in-
efficiency of irrigation application. This is based on pre-
vious work that has found a strategic relationship in 
farmer pumping decisions (Pfeiffer and Lin, 2012). 
Third, we hypothesize that farmers with equal cost 
sharing or land-based cost sharing will use groundwa-
ter more inefficiently than those who pay the full cost 
of their water consumption (i.e., those with cost shar-
ing based on the duration of irrigation).  
To test these hypotheses we estimate the quantity of 
groundwater irrigation used by all farmers who share 
the well based on the three characteristics of interest. 
We also include other control variables to account for 
other things that affect water use. For example, we also 
include information on climate conditions, average 
education level, total output, soil type, and crop type. 
However, we focus our discussion of results on the 
characteristics of interest1. 
Results: Our first hypothesis is that eliminating elec-
tricity subsidies will not have a large effect on ground-
water use. We find evidence this is true in our sample. 
Our estimates show that a 100 percent increase or dou-
bling of water prices (i.e., electricity prices) will only 
reduce groundwater use by 6 percent. So, while elimi-
nating subsidies will have some effect on groundwater 
use and aquifer depletion, that effect is extremely small. 
Policymakers who are concerned about aquifer sustain-
ability may find that other policy tools are more effec-
tive than subsidy elimination at encouraging conserva-
tion. 
Our second hypothesis is that irrigation inefficiency is 
greater when more farmers share a well. However, our 
results fail to support this hypothesis. We investigate 
this in several different ways such as including a subset 
of  the  wells and  including  multiple  indicators of  the  
___________________ 
1More details on the estimation results and other varia-
bles are available from the corresponding author.  
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number of users.  But, we find no empirical evidence from 
our sample that irrigation wells shared by a greater number 
of farmers are less efficient. While surprising, this result 
may show that farmers who share a well are organized in 
other decisions such as crops, acreage, and timing of irriga-
tion use. It’s important to note that this result may not 
hold worldwide. Other countries with shared wells may 
not show the same result. But, this provides evidence that 
well sharing is unlikely to be a major source of irrigation 
inefficiency in Mexican irrigated agriculture.    
Our last hypothesis is related to cost sharing rules. Past 
policy recommendations on improving the efficiency and 
sustainability of groundwater have failed to recognize this 
as an important issue for policymakers to address. Howev-
er, our results support our hypothesis and show that cost 
sharing rules are a major source of inefficiency in irrigation 
application. We use the case where farmers pay the full 
cost of their water use (i.e., volumetric pricing) as the base 
case with an irrigation efficiency of 100 percent. Relative to 
the base case, an equal cost share rule and a land based cost 
share rule reduce irrigation efficiency to 58 and 73 percent, 
respectively. Therefore, moving to volumetric pricing pro-
vides a substantially larger improvement in irrigation effi-
ciency than eliminating or reducing electricity subsidies. 
However, we caution that a thorough analysis of these ben-
efits needs to incorporate the costs of implementing volu-
metric pricing, something we were unable to do in our 
study.  
Summary and conclusion: We investigate the effect of mul-
tiple characteristics of shared wells on groundwater use 
efficiency. While some of the characteristics (price, number 
of users) have been studied in other areas, we do not know 
of other work that has included cost sharing as a potential-
ly important source of irrigation inefficiency. We find evi-
dence that wells that use a cost sharing rule instead of volu-
metric pricing have greater irrigation inefficiency, and that 
the difference is both statistically and economically signifi-
cant. This provides evidence that policymakers should en-
courage users of shared wells to move away from arbitrary 
cost sharing rules and toward rules that incorporate volu-
metric pricing.  
 
